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The economics of growth has shown that countries not only grow by deploying higher 
levels of inputs to production, but also by better allocating whatever resources are at their 
disposal and by introducing productivity-enhancing innovations. We proffer arguments 
as to why and how entrepreneurship as well institutions of liberty (i.e., economic 
freedom, including the rule of law, easy regulations, low taxes and limited government 
interference in the economy) positively impact total factor productivity (TFP): These 
institutions allow entrepreneurial experimentation with the combination of factors to take 
place at low transaction costs. We test these ideas on a unique panel data set derived 
from Compendia, World Bank data and the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom data. We 
find that while entrepreneurship positively impacts TFP, the marginal contribution of 





Differential national growth was at the center of economics at the beginnings of the discipline:  
Adam Smith famously argued that the “obvious and simple system of natural liberty” was strongly 
conducive to growth and thus placed institutions as the heart of economic progress and growth 
(Holcombe, 1998). The right institutions lead to an increasing division of labor, which in turn prompt 
innovation and productivity advances carried out by enterprising firms and individuals. Later 
economists shifted the attention away from institutions and entrepreneurship and towards labor 
growth and capital accumulation as the main drivers of growth, with unexplained technological 
progress as an add-on, albeit an essential one. Solow’s (1956) seminal work is, of course, exemplary 
of this. However, his empirical finding (Solow, 1957) that the main part of the growth was caused by 
exogenous factors stimulated growth accounting as a sub-field in economics, and made endogenizing 
technological progress a pressing issue on the research agenda of the profession, although for various 
fundamentally technical reasons this took essentially three decades to achieve (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 
1990; Jones, 1995).  
 The overall insight emerging from this body of work is that one of the most important reasons 
why countries differ in terms of development is rooted in their different levels of productivity: 
Countries not only grow by deploying more inputs to production, but also by better allocating 
whatever resources are at their disposal and by introducing productivity-enhancing innovations 
(Temple, 1999). The notion of “total factor productivity” (henceforth, TFP) captures this. Klenow 
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) show that differences in TFP drive the main part of growth differences 
in a cross-country sample from 1960 to 1985. In turn, an emerging literature has begun exploring the 
“deeper” determinants of growth, that is, which factors cause differences in TFP. We link up with 
this literature and argue that the incentives defined by the institutional matrix of society will 
significantly influence TFP.  
 It has long been recognized that the institutional matrix impacts economic growth by 
influencing the labor/leisure tradeoff, structuring the incentives to expend effort and accumulate 
capital, and so on (e.g., North, 1990; Glaeser, La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004). Less interest 
has been devoted to understanding how it impacts TFP, that is, output changes that are not caused by 
changes in the “traditional” inputs of labor and capital. We proffer arguments as to why “economic 
freedom variables” influence TFP (cf. also Gwartney, Lawson, and Holcombe, 1999; Klein and Luu, 
2003; Méon and Weill, 2005). We specifically argue that economic freedom, including the rule of 
law, easy regulations, low taxes and limited government interference in the economy, allows 
entrepreneurial experimentation with combining productive factors to take place in a low transaction 
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costs manner. Such institutions of liberty thereby increase the aggregate elasticity of substitution, an 
important mechanism in the growth process.1  
 To assess these issues empirically, we rely on a variety of data sources. We follow Nyström 
(2009) in measuring entrepreneurial activity as harmonized self-employment rates for OECD 
countries from the Compendia database (van Stel, 2005); we use the well-known economic freedom 
indices (Gwartney and Lawson, 2009) to ask which elements of economic policy making and the 
institutional framework affect the supply of entrepreneurship in societies; and we finally draw on 
data from Barro and Lee (2001) and the Penn World Tables to construct data on a standard measure 




Total Factor Productivity  
 The understanding of the growth process in economics has historically involved a fundamental 
debate between those who stress the driving role of capital accumulation (Jorgenson & Griliches, 
1967; Lucas, 1988) and those who stress “technology” (Solow, 1956, 1957) and other factors that fall 
outside the accumulation of capital and improvement of and increases in the supply of human capital 
(cf. Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Hulten, 2001). According to the latter camp, the growth process is 
fundamentally one of improvements in TFP. Thus, disparities in wealth and productivity across 
nations are driven by “residual factors.” Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999) 
and Parente and Prescott (2000) present evidence that most of the extant cross-country differences in 
output per worker is driven by differences in total factor productivities.  
 It has long been recognized that TFP is about much more than “technology”, understood as 
recipe-like advances in scientific knowledge (Erken, Donselaar, and Thurik, 2008; Acs, 
Braunerhjelm, Audretsch, and Carlsson 2009). Since the initial identification of the “unexplained” 
causes of growth (Solow, 1956), significant attention has been devoted to R&D as a driver of growth 
(e.g., Romer, 1990; Coe and Helpman, 1995). However, R&D itself does not drive TFP; innovations 
that emerge from R&D do (Acs et al., 2009). In turn, innovations are introduced by enterprising 
firms and individuals (Schumpeter, 1939; Baumol, 1993). 
 Although it stands to reason that the “entrepreneur is the prime mover of progress” (Kirzner, 
1980), it is only very recently that growth economists have explicitly begun to model and measure 
                                                 
1 That economic freedom variables are significantly associated with the level of entrepreneurship in an economy has been 




the entrepreneurial function.2 Foss, Foss, Klein and Klein (2007) argue that the dominance of the 
production function framework in post-war economics is a main cause of the neglect of the 
entrepreneur: If production factors are assumed to be homogenous within categories (e.g., Solow’s 
“shmoo” capital) and production is always at the efficient frontier, there is simply very little to do for 
the entrepreneur. In actuality, factors of production are heterogeneous (Lachmann, 1956), how they 
should be combined is often by no means obvious, and requires technical and commercial processes 
that are in a sense experimental in nature (Hayek, 1968; Matsusaka, 2001).3 The optimum 
combination of inputs is not a datum. Moreover, what is at any moment the optimum combination 
will change as a result of changes in underlying scarcities. Given this, some matching process is 
required. Hayek (1968) forcefully argues that given the dispersed nature of knowledge in society, 
competition performs such matching in a superior way compared to the known alternatives.  
 Ongoing processes of industrial dynamics, that is, processes of mergers, divestments, spin-offs, 
new firm formation, etc. reflect such experimentation. On the aggregate level, they amount to the 
economy tracking its (moving) production possibility frontier, and therefore to improving the 
efficiency with which resources are utilized. For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (1998) 
estimate that competitive dynamics through reallocation of productive assets account for about 50% 
of the aggregate productivity growth. Moreover, hampering the automatic restructuring of industries 
in developed countries has been shown to imply a penalty in terms of forgone growth (Audretsch 
Carree, van Stel, and Roy, 2003). These processes are driven by entrepreneurs alert to seizing 
hitherto overlooked possibilities of profit (Kirzner, 1997). Also, entrepreneurs that are alert to 
knowledge produced abroad and import it in the hope of realizing a profit opportunity contribute to 
national catching-up (Fagerberg, 1987), that is, the national production possibility frontier tracking 
those of more advanced nations. The upshot of the above is a hypothesis that entrepreneurship 
positively contributes to TFP.  
Institutions  
                                                 
2 Entrepreneurship has also been included in models inspired by endogenous growth theory (Erken et al. 2008).Audretsch 
et al. (2006) and Acs et al. (2004) argue that a primary function of entrepreneurship is to perform a search within the 
available knowledge stock and pick those parts of this stock that can give rise to new products or processes. Typically, 
this function is carried out by upstart firms. There is still little empirical work on this. Temple’s (1999) overview of 
empirical work on growth contains no mention whatsoever of entrepreneurship. Part of the reason is that data-sources 
that allowed for cross-national comparisons have been virtually non-existent. The first data set (i.e., the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor) that allows for consistent cross-national comparisons was initiated as late as 1999. 
3 From such a perspective, the conventional distinction in the growth literature between factor accumulation and 
productivity as differential drivers of growth may be overdrawn: entrepreneurship underlies both, as capital is not a 
passive accumulation of Shmoo capital least in the private sector of the economy), but is deployed to actual production 




Economic historians have long pointed to crucial role that institutions play in the growth 
process (as neatly summarized in North, 1990), and the economics growth literature is increasingly 
following suit. Thus, important work suggests that different institutions are differentially impact 
growth, and although factors such as human capital are by no means unimportant (Glaeser et al., 
2004; Acemoglu, 2005), some scholars (e.g., Rodrik, Subramaniam, and Trebbi., 2004) go so far as 
to claim that “institutions rule” in the sense that institutional quality overwhelms other determinants 
of growth. The main reason to expect institutional quality to affect growth positively is that it entails 
decreased transaction costs through reduced uncertainty of economic transactions and productivity-
enhancing incentives. As North explains, “[t]he major role of institutions in a society is to reduce 
uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction. The 
overall stability of an institutional framework makes complex exchange possible across both time 
and space” (North, 1990: 6). In turn, higher certainty implies lower transaction costs, as the costs of 
entering into, bargaining, monitoring and protecting contractual and ownership rights are reduced 
(Barzel, 2005). This increases the expected value of projects, and hence make them more likely to be 
undertaken. By offering incentives for productive behaviour, efficient institutions stimulate 
individuals to engage in those actions where the private return is close to the social return (Demsetz, 
1967). The two effects, reducing uncertainty and providing efficient incentives, are, in our view, 
jointly necessary and sufficient for institutional quality. 
Higher certainty and incentives for productive behavior may arise on the basis of many 
institutional characteristics, not least those relating to the protection of private property rights. Some 
examples of such characteristics are: generality (that equals are treated equally), transparency in 
public decision-making, accountability in public decision-making and, importantly, an expectation 
that the institutions will be properly implemented and enforced. In such a setting, agents are more 
willing to engage in economic transactions. Thus, by giving political and economic actors incentives 
to behave honestly and predictably, high quality institutions help ensure that consequences of 
economic undertakings are more easily foreseen and that incentives stimulate productive rather than 
unproductive behavior (cf. Baumol, 1996). This contributes to economic growth.  
Freedom Variables 
 The above abstract identification of those institutional characteristics that are conducive to 
efficient allocation as well as (we argue later) growth are closely related to what may be called 
“freedom variables.” Thus, stable, well-defined property rights and the rule of law are traditionally 
central in classical liberal thought (e.g., Hayek, 1973). Conversely, economists have typically treated 
economic freedom as a composite construct that includes such components that all ultimately boil 
down to the security and extent of property rights, but include, for example, the freedom to save, to 
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change jobs, to devise contracts, to keep income, etc. In particular, many scholars, and certainly 
those with a leaning towards classical liberalism (e.g., Friedman, 1962), have used the size of 
government in a broad sense⎯that is, the extent to which the government intervenes in the economy 
through government consumption, redistribution through transfer schemes, public investments, and 
marginal taxation⎯as an adequate, or at least reasonable, measure of economic freedom (e.g., 
Gwartney, Lawson, and Holcombe, 1999; Carlsson and Lundström, 2002).  
 An important item in an economic freedom measure arguably is sound money (Friedman, 
1962), in particular the rate and variability of inflation. Anticipations of future relative prices are 
important in general for economic decision makers. Inflation, and particularly erratic inflation, 
“jams” the signalling effects of relative prices (Friedman, 1977). This is particularly troublesome in 
for those agents who undertake intertemporal allocation, namely entrepreneurs.   
 Another relevant “freedom variable” is the degree of openness to international trade and 
investment. Larger trade flows through a country may arguably imply more access to international 
price signals, allowing potential entrepreneurs to take advantage of not only national but also 
international opportunities. In addition, freedom to invest could, as is often found in empirical 
studies, increase the rate of technology adoption (cf. Wacziarg, 2001; Madsen, 2008). In addition, the 
absence of capital restrictions also implies easier access to international capital markets. 
 Finally, public regulation is an important item in an economic freedom measure (Kirzner, 
1985). Excessive regulations impose burdens on all firms, not the least start-ups, that may imply 
prohibitive start-up costs. In addition, Baumol (1996) makes the point that individuals operating in 
heavily regulated economic environment may have larger gains from engaging in rent-seeking 
activities within the public sector (i.e., “destructive entrepreneurship”) than in real economic 
activities (Capelleras, Mole, Greene, and Storey, 2007).  
Transmission Mechanisms: Institutions, Freedom Variables, and Total Factor Productivity 
 In the recent surge of interest in the institutional determinants of growth, it is arguable that the 
micro-foundations of the link between institutions and growth have been somewhat neglected. As 
Wennekers and Thurik (1999: 27) suggest, more attention should be devoted to the 
economic agents who link the institutions at the micro level to the economic outcome at 
the macro level. It remains veiled how exactly institutions and cultural factors frame the 
decisions of the millions of entrepreneurs and of entrepreneurial managers working with 
large companies. 
While this issue remains of general interest in the context of growth theory, it partakes of particular 
significance in the context of understanding why institutions (and policies, broadly conceived), 
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including freedom variables, drive TFP: Increases in TFP result from new processes, new modes of 
organization, ways of better allocating resources to preferred uses, and so on.  
 Given this, the flexibility (i.e., costliness) with which such changes can be carried out becomes 
highly important. In terms of production theory, this flexibility is captured by notion of the elasticity 
of factor substitution (Klump and De La Grandville, 2000), that is, the the percentage change in 
factor proportions due to a change in marginal rate of technical substitution (e.g., in the extreme 
example of a Leontieff technology, the elasticity is 0). At the level of a country, the (aggregate) 
elasticity of substitution is a measure of the flexibility of the economy, for example, with respect to 
reacting to external shocks (Acquilina et al., 2006: 204). It is also clear that the elasticity of 
substitution is affected by a number of forces; for example, an argument for liberalizing such trade, is 
that such trade may expand the possibility set with respect to input combinations that a country’s 
entrepreneurs face. Hence, it becomes less likely that a single factor will act as a brake on the growth 
process (Ventura, 1997).  
 This suggests that the elasticity of substitution goes beyond being a purely technical issue (or a 
“deep parameter”). In fact, recent work (particularly Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou, 2006) argues that 
the aggregate elasticity of substitution should be seen as endogenous (but see already Arrow et al., 
1961). Although certain inherent technical constraints imply that factors will never be perfect 
substitutes, we argue that the aggregate elasticity of substitution is to a large extent endogenous to 
institutional variables, specifically to freedom variables. In turn, a high elasticity of substitution 
implies high factor productivity, because it means that resources are more easily allocated to highly 
valued uses, new modes of organization and new processes are more easily implemented and so on.  
 Underlying the positive impact on factor productivity of high elasticity of substitution are a 
high degree of certainty in dealings, and therefore low transaction costs of searching for contract 
partners, bargaining, monitoring and enforcing contracts. Huge literatures in economic history, on 
intellectual property rights, and on innovation stress the importance for entrepreneurial activity at the 
micro level and economic development at the macro level of property rights being well-defined and 
enforced (e.g., North, 1990: Glaeser et al. 2004; Mokyr, 2006). Well-defined and enforced property 
rights reduce the transaction costs of carrying out the commercial experimentation, that is, 
entrepreneurship (Rosenberg, 1992), because well-defined property rights usually imply that 
contracting costs are relatively low, and it is thus less costly to search for, negotiate with and 
conclude bargains with owners of those inputs that enter into entrepreneurial ventures. Well-defined 
and enforced income rights imply that the risk of undertaking entrepreneurial activities is reduced, 
which may also stimulate the supply of entrepreneurship. If so, it can be expected that institutional 
features, such as the quality of regulations and the judicial system, positively affect TFP.  
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 Similar reasoning applies to the freedom variable of sound money (Friedman, 1962), in 
particular the rate and variability of inflation. Inflation, and particularly erratic inflation, “jams” the 
signalling effects of relative prices (Friedman, 1977). This directly harms the process of allocating 
resources to their most highly valued uses, and therefore negatively impacts TFP. Moreover, erratic 
inflation makes it more risky to undertake long-term projects, and therefore may harm the incentives 
of those individuals who receive the residual income from such projects, that is, entrepreneurs 
(Knight, 1921). Finally, the concept and measurement of sound money is associated with the level of 
financial development and financial depth, and is as such a proxy for the access to capital.  
 Following Ventura (1997) we argue that the degree of openness to international trade and 
investment positively impacts the elasticity of substitution, and, in turn, TFP. Larger trade flows 
through a country may arguably imply more access to international price signals, thus allowing 
domestic agents to take advantage of not only national but also international opportunities. In 
addition, freedom to invest could, as is often found in empirical studies, increase the rate of 
technology adoption (cf. Wacziarg, 2001). The fewer restrictions on capital movements across 
borders, the easier the access to international capital markets. This increases the supply of venture 
capital, which may boost innovation (Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006; Kortum and Lerner, 2000).  
 Following Kirzner (1985) public regulation is an important item in an economic freedom 
measure that is relevant to understanding the flexibility with which the market system works and 
therefore also how TFP develops. Arguably, regulations can both help and hinder entrepreneurs who 
need clear rules and predictable enforcement of those rules. On the other hand, excessive regulations 
impose burdens on all firms, not the least start-ups, that may imply prohibitive start-up costs. In 
addition, Baumol (1990) made the point that individuals operating in heavily regulated economic 
environment may have larger gains from engaging in rent-seeking activities within the public sector 
― what he termed “destructive entrepreneurship” ― than in real economic activities. 
 There are many reasons why the size of government may be expected on a priori grounds to 
influence TFP. Most directly, if economic activities in certain industries or sectors have essentially 
been nationalized, the scope for entrepreneurship in those industries and sections is reduced, as 
nationalization often (but of course not necessarily) implies a public monopoly. In most parts of the 
Western industrialized world this is clearly the case of child care, health care, and care of the elderly. 
The effective nationalization of these industries means that the operation of the price mechanism 
becomes severely hampered (Mises, 1949), eliminating entrepreneurship and reducing the 
adaptability of the industries to effectively adapt to changing circumstances.   
 As Henrekson (2005: 11) and Bjørnskov and Foss (2008) argue, to the extent that a large 
government is associated with high levels of publicly financed provision of various services (e.g., 
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care of the elderly, education, etc.), with generous social security systems, and with levels of 
taxation,  the incentives to engage in entrepreneurial acts in order to make a living (what is often 
called “necessity entrepreneurship”) are reduced because a relatively high reservation wage is 
practically guaranteed and because entrepreneurial incomes are heavily taxed. Such schemes also 
reduce incentives for individual wealth formation which may be expected to negatively influence the 
level of entrepreneurial activity (Henrekson, 2005: 11). One reason has to do with entrepreneurial 
judgment being idiosyncratic and often hard to clearly communicate to potential investors (Knight, 
1921). The entrepreneur may have to finance his venture himself, at least in the start-up phase. If 
individual wealth formation is reduced because of generous public transfer schemes, etc., this makes 
such financing difficult. Moreover, if entrepreneurs are only able to commit small amounts of 
personal capital to their entrepreneurial venture, their signal to potential outside investors concerning 
their commitment to the venture is correspondingly weaker.  
 However, some scholars have argued that large welfare states create the sufficient stability to 
allow more people to commit larger amounts of capital to entrepreneurial activities (Galbraith, 
2006).4 Another mechanism introduced by Hirschman (1958) in connection with this ideas of 
“balanced growth” is the notion of a creative tension between government interventions and 
innovation: If government controls a large share of the economy, it places an artificial competitive 
pressure on private actors, which induces them to search for more productive solutions; that is, it 
forces them into entrepreneurial activities. In addition, we note that a positive association between 
government intervention and the marginal returns to entrepreneurship could arise as government 
activity pushes some entrepreneurs out of society, only leaving the most promising entrepreneurial 
ideas. 
 In sum, the above suggests the hypotheses that secure property rights, a high quality of 
regulations and the judicial system, sound money, openness to international trade and investment 
positively influence TFP, while a high level of regulation and a large government and high taxes may 
or may not be harmful to TFP.  
 A final issue concerns the possible interaction between entrepreneurship and institutions with 
respect to influencing TFP, and in particular how the institutional environment moderates the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and TFP. To a certain extent this has already been touched 
upon in the above discussion of the transmission mechanisms from entrepreneurship and institutions 
to influencing TFP: If the institutions of liberty that are captured by “freedom variables” positively 
impact TFP because they reduce uncertainty, increase predictability, and reduce transaction costs, 
                                                 
4 We nevertheless note that the evidence for this argument is scant, and the available studies tend to show the exact 
opposite association between government size and entrepreneurial activity (Bjørnskov and Foss, 2008; Nyström, 2009). 
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they largely do so because they pave the way for the kind of entrepreneurial experimentation that 
lead to productivity enhancing innovations in products, processes and ways of organizing productive 
activities. This reasoning therefore suggests the hypothesis that freedom variables positively impact 
the relation between entrepreneurship and TFP, in other words, the more economic freedom, the 
more strongly entrepreneurship will impact on overall productivity. 
 However, this same reasoning also implies that entrepreneurship at the margin could be more 
effective in countries with less economic freedom. Given that poor institutions and limited economic 
freedom also limits TFP and reduces the incentives for entrepreneurship (cf. Nyström, 2009; Méon 
and Weill, in press), the entrepreneurial activity actually observed in such countries is likely to be 
highly productive. As such, the medium-run interacting relationship between economic freedom and 
entrepreneurship (total or marginal) may be ambiguous. 
 
DATA, MEASURES, AND MODEL 
Total Factor Productivity 
Like entrepreneurial activity, TFP cannot be measured with a high degree of precision. We 
follow a growing literature by calculating the so-called Solow-residual from growth accounting 
exercises.5 The basis for this approach is that development accounting decomposes the observed 
differences in levels of output per worker across countries into differences in the employment of 
input factors and a residual, which is taken to be international differences in TFP. The identifying 
assumption in such exercises is that production is characterized by the following Cobb-Douglas 
production function, which we outline in logs: 
logY = logA +α logK + (1-α)log (Lh)    (1) 
As usual, Y is output, K aggregate capital stock, L the number of workers or work hours, and h 
is the average stock of human capital; Lh thus measures the size of the quality-adjusted labor force. 
Furthermore, α measures the capital share of output while 1-α therefore measures the share 
contributed by quality-adjusted labor. The share of output that is not explained by input factors, that 
is A, logically must be TFP.6 
 This approach necessitates that one has a measure of the size of the stock of physical capital, 
K. While this stock is not measured directly, we follow standard practice in most papers by 
                                                 
5 This and alternative approaches are surveyed in Caselli (2005). This paper also contains much information on the 
intricacies of estimating TFP.  
6 Note that although using a Cobb-Douglas function with the above restriction on the income share of capital and 
effective labor may seem restrictive, recent work by Aiyar and Dalgaard (2009) suggests that the loss of precision 
imposed by this specific functional form is minimal. 
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estimating it using the perpetual inventory method (as in, e.g., King and Levine, 1994). Noting that 
the capital stock develops as Kt = Kt − 1 × (1 – δ) + It − 1, we set the depreciation rate to .06. Investment 
rates are available from the Penn World Tables dataset since 1950 for most countries (Heston et al., 
2006). This leaves the problem of how to assess the size of the initial capital stock, for which a 
reasonable guess is derived from the Solow-Swan growth model. Here, the initial stock of physical 
capital is given by K0 = I0 / (g + δ), where I0 is the value of investment in the first year for which an 
observation is available, and g is the average rate of growth for the following twenty years. As we 
use no data before 1980, the share of the initial capital stock still in use at any time during our period 
is likely to be small, which makes the consequences of assumptions surrounding the initial stock 
negligible.7 
With respect to measuring human capital, we follow Hall and Jones (1999) in estimating this as 
a piecewise linear function.8 We use data on the average length of schooling of individuals above the 
age of 25 from the widely used Barro-Lee dataset (Barro and Lee, 2001). As the final assumption, we 
need to make an assumption on the size of α. Although this parameter is critical in development 
accounting exercises, the literature disagrees on which value is most consistent with real-world 
production functions (Caselli, 2005). We follow Bjørnskov and Méon’s (2010) estimates and set α at 
.4. 
Measuring Entrepreneurship  
 With respect to measuring entrepreneurship, we use the dataset provided by the Compendia 
research group (van Stel, 2005). As raw data on self-employment in the OECD statistics are 
generally not comparable across countries, mainly due to variations in how owners/managers of 
incorporated businesses are included (OECD, 2009), data have to be harmonized before cross-
country comparisons make sense. The Compendia database addresses this problem by including 
owners/managers of both unincorporated and incorporated businesses. The data excludes unpaid 
family members working for the business, as well as people with self-employment as a secondary 
activity (van Steel, 2005). While this may lead to underestimating the full impact of entrepreneurship 
as the entrepreneurial associated with established firms is excluded, focusing solely on primary self-
                                                 
7 Given our assumption of an annual depreciation rate of 6 % and the fact that the investment series in the Penn World 
Tables for most of our countries start in 1950, the maximum initial capital stock left in at the beginning of the period 
(1980) is 15 % and only 3 % at the end (2005). This makes the assumptions behind the construction of initial capital 
stocks rather innocuous.  
8 The specific form of φ, the piecewise linear function, is φ(s) = 0.134×s if s ≤ 4, φ(s) = 0.134×4 + 0.101×(s − 4) if 
4 < s ≤ 8, and φ(s) = 0.134×4 + 0.101×4 + 0.068×(s − 8) if s > 8. 
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employment ensures that we measure actual economic activity (Nyström 2009).9 By adding a control 
variable measuring the size of the population employed in agriculture, we implicitly assume that 
entrepreneurship is mainly associated with productivity improvements in the manufacture and 
service sectors. This control is also necessary as the Compendia data effectively excludes agricultural 
self-employment. 
Institutions 
Our institutional data all derive from the annual reports of the Fraser Institute on Economic 
Freedom in the World (Gwartney & Lawson, 2009). These data have been used in many studies on 
growth and other macroeconomic outcomes (de Haan and Sturn, 2000; Méon and Weill, 2005; de 
Haan et al., 2006; Dreher et al., 2007; Knack and Heckelman, 2007; Aghion, Algan, Cahuc and 
Shleifer., 2008; Bjørnskov, 2008; Justesen, 2008), and are usually deemed to be among the most 
precise institutional measures available (Berggren, 2003). 
Rather than using the full index of economic freedom, we employ the five sub-indices of 
economic freedom. These indices are meant to cover five distinct areas of institutions and 
overarching policies, the first of which is Government size. This index measures the extent to which 
the government intervenes in the economy through consumption, redistribution through transfer 
schemes, public investments, and marginal taxation. In separate analyses, we alternatively split it 
into its four sub-components. Government consumption is measured as the share of general 
government consumption spending in total consumption; transfers and subsidies as general 
government transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP; government enterprises and investment is 
measured as the share of output supplied by state-operated enterprises and government investment as 
a share of total investment; and the tax burden index is an index composed of the top marginal 
income and payroll tax rates and the share of income threshold at which they take effect (Gwartney 
and Lawson, 2009). 
The second measure of institutional and policy quality is that of Legal quality, measuring the 
protection and respect for the rights of people to their own lives and rightfully acquired property. The 
legal quality index is composed of indicators of judicial independence, impartiality of the courts, 
protection of intellectual property rights, military interference in law and politics, and integrity of the 
legal system. A third index captures Sound money, defined as the rate and variability of inflation and 
monetary controls. As such, this is a measure of the consistency of monetary policy but also captures 
notions of financial sector development and financial depth. Fourth, the economic freedom data 
                                                 
9 Previous papers have employed the data provided by the Global Entrepreneurship consortium (e.g. Levie and Auttio, 
2008; Bjørnskov and Foss, 2008). However, these data only allow estimating a consistent panel between 2001 and 2006, 
which does not provide sufficient variation to estimate the full effects of institutions (see also OECD, 2009).  
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includes an index of Freedom to trade internationally, which measures the extent of trade and 
barriers to trade and capital flows through actual trade and investment flows and through indicators 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and capital. Finally, the data include an index of Regulatory 
quality, composed of three sub-indices of the freedom from government regulations and controls in 
the labour market, financial and credit markets, and the price controls in the markets for goods and 
services. These three areas are again composed of: 1) the impact of minimum wages, hiring and 
firing practices, the share of the labour force with wages set in centralized bargaining, the generosity 
of unemployment benefits, and the use of conscript military personnel; 2) the percentage of deposits 
held in privately owned banks, bank competition, percentage of credit extended to the private sector, 
and the extent of interest rate controls; and 3) price controls, administrative procedures that are 
obstacles to business, time spent with the bureaucracy, the ease of starting new businesses, and the 
necessity of irregular payments. 
Control Variables 
We also add a set of other determinants of TFP that seem to be emerging as standard controls 
in the literature. The array of additional control variables includes openness, measured as trade 
volumes as percent of GDP, government final consumption (i.e. government consumption excluding 
transfers), a dummy for post-communist countries, the share of the population employed in 
agriculture,  and a full set of period dummies to take jointly international productivity increases into 
account. The former variables derive from the Penn World Tables, mark 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006), 
while agricultural employment is from the World Bank (2009) database.  
We employ two further variables as instruments. The first is the price level of capital and 
investment goods from the Penn World Tables. The second is Dreher’s (2006) measure of 
information flows, which captures the size and ease of information flows to a country from the rest 
of the world. We provide test statistics for these instruments throughout; note that their inclusion also 
means that any interaction is instrumented as well. All data are summarized in Table 1. 
———————————— 
Insert Table 1 here 
———————————— 
Specification and Estimation Strategy  
These data give us a slightly unbalanced panel of 25 countries observed in the six five-year 
intervals between 1980 and 2005.10 The countries and their 2005 levels of TFP relative to the US are 
                                                 
10 Although this may give rise to an issue with unobserved heterogeneity, we submit that this is not likely to be a major 
problem as only 10 out of 150 potential observations are missing.  
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listed in the appendix. In the following, we estimate the determinants of TFP through the simple 
specification in (2), where A is TFP, E is entrepreneurial activity, F is a vector of the economic 
freedom variables, X is a vector of control variables, a, b, c, d are the coefficients to be estimated, 
and u is a normally distributed error term. In a further set of regressions, we also include interaction 
terms between E and F in order to test the hypothesis that that the effects of entrepreneurship are 
moderated by the institutional environment. 
A = a + bE + cF + dX + u     (2) 
We first present our main results estimated by simple OLS with Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel-
corrected standard errors, which we subsequently supplement in two different ways.11 To alleviate 
the problem of endogeneity and simultaneity, we first shift to providing instrumental variables 
estimates. This is necessary, as potential entrepreneurs might rationally react to opportunities 
resulting from being behind the international production possibility frontier, so that TPF drives 
entrepreneurship. Specifically, it is arguable that lacking productivity may induce higher levels of 
entrepreneurship, given that being far from the production possibility frontier may imply higher 
potential returns to entrepreneurial activity. As tests suggest that this is a problem, simple OLS will 
be biased, and we therefore instrument for entrepreneurship in a set of two-stage least squares 
estimates.  
Second, our theoretical considerations suggest that the effects of entrepreneurship might be 
heterogeneous across economic policies and institutions. We therefore provide a set of estimates 
including interaction terms. We outline the conditional effects of entrepreneurship, bearing in mind 
that such estimates must be interpreted with care, as both effects and standard errors are conditional 
(cf. Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006).   
We note that the TFP measures themselves are estimates. Even if the literature on TFP ignores 
this problem and employs these estimates as if they were precise, we acknowledge this problem and 




 We report the results of estimating the effects of economic freedom and entrepreneurship on 
TFP in Table 2 below. Columns 1 and 2 provide the baseline, estimated by simple OLS. We first 
note that our control variables turn out as expected. Government final consumption, measuring the 
                                                 
11 Ideally, one would estimate these relations using a more “proper” panel data estimator. However, when having only six 
periods in an unbalanced panel of 25 countries, standard random and fixed effects GLS estimators are inefficient. We 
therefore rely on simpler techniques, supplemented by robustness tests. 
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extent to which productive economic activity takes place in the public sector, is strongly negatively 
associated with TFP; openness to trade is positively associated; while the share of the population 
employed in agriculture is negatively associated with TFP. However, the status of post-communist 
countries is unclear, although they remain less productive than other OECD countries. Yet, we note 
that both Hungarian and Polish TFP have converged rapidly towards OECD standards in recent 
years. Finally, the five-year period dummies (not shown) exhibit a clear, joint international trend 
towards higher TFP. 
———————————— 
Insert Table 2 here 
———————————— 
 Turning to our central variables in column 1, only one of the five indices of economic freedom 
turns out to be statistically significant. Government size—which is composed of indices capturing 
the extent to which government intervenes in the economy through consumption, redistribution 
through transfer schemes, public investments, and marginal taxation—is negatively associated with 
TFP. As the index measures the freedom from government intervention, it suggests that more 
intervention is associated with higher TFP. However, we note that since we have already controlled 
for the size of production in the government sector, what we effectively find is that government 
intervention affects the productivity of non-government production. The other central feature, our 
measure of entrepreneurship, is significantly positively associated with TFP. Column 2 shows that 
this association is not affected by deleting insignificant institutional variables.12  
Instrumenting Entrepreneurship 
 However, OLS estimates are likely to suffer from endogeneity bias if entrepreneurs react to 
opportunities associated with, for example, being far from the production possibility frontier. In 
columns 3-5, we therefore instrument entrepreneurship, using two intuitive variables. We employ the 
price level of capital and investment goods, which derives from the Penn World Tables (Heston et 
al., 2006). This variable is a proxy for the costs of setting up a business, which would necessarily be 
negatively associated with actual entrepreneurial activity, as opposed to potential entrepreneurship. 
The second instrument is Dreher’s (2006) measure of global information flows, which proxies for the 
ease with which new ideas and information reaches potential entrepreneurs. The partial R squared 
from a first stage regression with these instruments is .36. Relying on the estimates reported in 
                                                 
12 As entrepreneurship is associated with government size (cf. Nyström, 2009), any interaction effects may simply 
capture a non-linearity if the interaction term proxies for a squared entrepreneurship term. However, we have tested these 
association by adding a squared term. These tests show that the effect of entrepreneurship on its own is approximately 
linear. We can therefore have some confidence in the interpretation of the further results. 
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column 3 is moreover strongly warranted, as a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicates that self-
employment is clearly endogenous (Chi squared = 13.977; p < .000). 
 The IV estimates of entrepreneurship show a correspondingly larger effect, which we—given 
that the instruments pass tests for over- and underidentification—can interpret causally. In other 
words, we find evidence for a strong effect of entrepreneurship on TFP, which approximately 
doubles when we deal with what appears to be strong endogeneity bias.  
Entrepreneurship and Government Size 
 The estimates in columns 4 and 5 in which we add an interaction term between government 
size and entrepreneurship (the latter excludes clear outliers) suggest that this effect is heterogeneous 
in elements of economic policy. The more governments intervene (i.e., the lower the government 
size index), the smaller the effect of entrepreneurship. This association is illustrated in Figure 1, 
which includes the conditional confidence intervals. As can be seen in the figure, the relation 
becomes insignificant at levels above approximately 8.5, that is, a very high level. We do not show 
interactions with the remaining four indices of economic freedom, as none were significant. 
———————————— 
Insert Figure 1 here 
———————————— 
 We explore these results further in Table 4 in which we attempt to tease out which elements of 
government size are responsible for the effects. Before doing so, we nevertheless need to ascertain 
that the four subindices, from which the overall government index are constructed, are likely to 
measure different aspects of economic policy. This index has been the subject of prolonged debate in 
the literature with the assertion that it measures several aspects that are only weakly associated with 
each other (e.g., de Haan et al., 2006). The simple correlations reported in Table 3 also suggest that 
the four subindices are sufficiently differentiated to allow estimation of different effects. We 
therefore enter each of the four subindices and their interaction with entrepreneurship sequentially in 
Table 4; column 1 replicates the results in Table 2, column 4. 
———————————— 
Insert Table 3 here 
———————————— 
                                   ———————————— 
Insert Table 4 here 
———————————— 
 The results of two indices—that is, government enterprises and investment, and the tax burden 
as captured by the size and extent of the top marginal tax—both have interactions with 
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entrepreneurship that are significant across most of their distribution. Both interactions with 
government enterprises and the tax burden are negative, suggesting that entrepreneurship is relatively 
more important in societies in which the government plays a dominant role in the economy, either 
through production in government-owned enterprises and investments or in its financing activities. 
Neither government consumption, nor transfers and subsidies seem to significantly moderate the 
influence of entrepreneurship. 
 Even though the subindices are sufficiently correlated to be separable, the interaction terms are 
highly correlated by construction. Some multicollinearity is thus unavoidable when including more 
than one of these terms. To be able to separate effects, we therefore performed a ”beauty contest” in 
which we included all combinations of two subindices and their interaction terms with 
entrepreneurship.13 The outcome of this contest can be summarized as follows. Including interactions 
with the transfers and subsidies index does not significantly alter any other results, although the 
index per se is often negatively significant. Including the government enterprises index along with 
the tax burden reduces the interaction effect of the tax burden index, although it stays significant 
across most of its distribution. Given the significant correlation between these indices (cross-
sectional as well as time-series), one must nevertheless be cautious in drawing the conclusion that the 
tax burden is the less important index.  Both these findings are robust to including the remaining two 
indices and their interactions. 
 A careful reading of the beauty contest suggests that the influence of the level of 
entrepreneurial activity on TFP is mediated by the extent to which the government participates in 
actual productive activities (the government enterprises index) and by level and progressivity of the 
tax system. To illustrate these findings, Figures 2a and 2b plot the association between 
entrepreneurship and TFP, conditional on the level of each subindex of government size. 
 To make further sure that our conclusions are robust, we perform two types of robustness tests. 
We first perform a jackknife exercise in which we test the robustness of the main results in Table 4 
by excluding one country at a time from the sample. We then bootstrap our standard errors. The 
results of the jackknife exercise are reported in Table 5. 
———————————— 
Insert Table 5 here 
———————————— 
                                                 
13 Due to the intricacies associated with evaluating interaction effects (Brambor et al., 2006), we do not report the 
specifics of the beauty contest. The standard test statistics such as coefficients and standard errors or t-statistics assessed 
at the sample mean do not hold sufficient relevant information for testing interactions against each other.  
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 The results suggest that at least one of the findings is relatively robust to excluding single 
countries, and therefore not likely to be driven by outliers. For both government enterprises and the 
tax burden, the exclusion of Mexico results in the smallest estimate of entrepreneurship, as evaluated 
at the sample mean of government size, and the exclusion of Australia results in the largest estimate. 
The bootstrapped standard errors also change very little. 
 Yet, while the simple test statistics do not indicate any change in effects of entrepreneurship at 
the mean level, excluding Mexico leaves the interaction of the tax burden insignificant across its 
entire distribution. However, excluding either Mexico or Australia, that is, the two observations with 
the largest statistical leverage, restores the result. For the government enterprise index, we find that 
the size of the interaction effect is sensitive to leaving out these two countries, but remains 
significant throughout. We consequently must conclude that this particular result is robust, while the 
robustness of the tax burden result is debatable. 
 Finally, to illustrate the quantitative importance of entrepreneurship at different levels of 
government intervention in the economy, Table 6 provides the point estimates at the sample mean 
and the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distributions of the indices of government enterprises and tax 
burden, respectively. The figure in italics can be interpreted as the long-run impact of permanently 
increasing entrepreneurial activity by one standard deviation, or approximately six percentage points. 
———————————— 
Insert Table 6 here 
———————————— 
 Increasing entrepreneurial activity in the typical country in our sample induces a long-run 
change in TFP of roughly 85 % of a standard deviation in our average country. At the average level 
of active government involvement in the economy (the government enterprises index), this is 
reduced to 54 % (due to the highly skewed distribution of this index) and 88 % of a standard 
deviation at the average tax burden, that is, at the average financing structure of the government 
sector. However, increasing governments’ active involvement to the 25th percentile, about the level 
of France, increases the impact to 71 %. Correspondingly, increasing the tax burden to the 25th 
percentile, which is roughly the average European level, increases the marginal efficiency of 
entrepreneurial activity to 103 %.  
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Emerging literatures in the economics of growth examine the contribution of institutions and 
entrepreneurship to the explanation of the growth process. However, few papers consider both 
determinants simultaneously—the main purpose of this paper— perhaps due to the intricacies 
19 
 
involved in featuring institutions and entrepreneurship in the same model, as well as the general 
problem of securing reliable data on entrepreneurship. There is, however, a need to bring these 
determinants together, as there are strong reasons to suspect that they are closely intertwined in the 
growth process. Specifically, although we cannot directly test these ideas based on the aggregate data 
in our panel, we have argued that entrepreneurship influences total factor productivity because the 
optimum combination of productive factors is not a datum but needs to be discovered by enterprising 
firms and individuals. We argued that it is particularly natural to assume that entrepreneurship will 
impact TFP. Similarly, we argued that the effect of institutions on TFP is mediated through the 
reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs that institutions may bring about (cf. North, 1991). In 
turn, the link from entrepreneurship to total factor productivity is moderated by institutions and 
economic policy. Relative to the extant literature, our emphasis on TPF as well as the moderation 
effect of institutions are novel contributions.  
 Relying on harmonized entrepreneurship data (van Stel, 2005) we built a unique panel dataset 
consisting of 25 countries observed in the six five-year intervals between 1980 and 2005, and tested 
the influence of entrepreneurship and institutions on TFP as well as the moderation effect of 
institutions on the entrepreneurship-TFP link. While entrepreneurship strongly and significantly 
impacts TFP, our results only partially support the intuition that institutions of liberty as well as 
liberal economic policies promote growth in productivity. In fact, we find no significant effects of 
sound money and legal quality on TFP in the medium run. When some of the freedom variables are 
interacted with the entrepreneurship variable, we in fact find that entrepreneurial activity is more 
effective in raising levels of TFP in environments dominated or strongly influenced by government 
activity, either through production in government-owned enterprises and investments or in its 
financing activities. Thus, increasing the active involvement of the government in the economy as 
well as the tax burden actually increases the impact of entrepreneurship on TFP.  
 This runs counter to our initial theoretical expectation, and, at first glance, the finding seems 
surprising. The problem that the public sector does not directly innovate would seem to be a major 
problem with a large welfare state; however, our perhaps key finding in this paper is that 
entrepreneurship is in fact most effective in terms of raising productivity under exactly these 
conditions. From the perspective of proponents of a large welfare state apparatus, this might be good 
news, as the effectiveness of entrepreneurship in terms of impacting overall productivity limits, as it 
were, how bad the economy performs in a welfare state. Moreover, some may take our finding as 
evidence that the state can successfully raise the effectiveness of entrepreneurship in terms of 
increasing overall productivity. Thus, our results may suggest that investments in public 
“infrastructure services” (Barro, 1990) may positively impact productivity because they are 
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complementary to (private) investments undertaken by entrepreneurs in the improvement of 
processes, products, organizations, etc. (cf. also Hirschman, 1958). 
 On the other hand, this may well be a too hasty conclusion, as the relation between 
entrepreneurship, TFP and the size of the welfare state is not trivial, and may perhaps best be thought 
of as a recursive system. While our results suggest that the effect of entrepreneurship on TFP is 
larger in welfare states, other work has found that the welfare state significantly reduces the supply 
of entrepreneurship (Henrekson, 2005; Kreft and Sobel, 2005; Bjørnskov and Foss, 2008; Nystrøm, 
2009). The welfare state-entrepreneurship association must therefore instead be thought of as a 
system in which one element undermines the supply of the other, and thereby increases its measured 
effectiveness. As a consequence, it a priori seems quite reasonable to infer that a reduced supply of 
entrepreneurship increases the marginal productivity of entrepreneurship; thus, the best ideas do 
survive even in the relatively hostile welfare state environment (Henreksson, 2005). This is very 
likely the basic mechanism that explains our finding. Moreover, from the overall perspective of job 
creation, it is quite likely that it is desirable that not only the very best entrepreneurial ideas survive, 
but also the good, but not great ones. There is some evidence that a few major entrepreneurial ideas 
and firms may sometimes impact the performance of a whole economy – the telecommunications 
giant Nokia in Finland is often mentioned as an example – and of course major technological 
breakthroughs have decisively influenced growth and development in the course of economic history 
(cf. Mokyr, 2006). And yet, it is seldom the case that a few major entrepreneurial innovations have 
the potential to decisively influence so many sectors in the economy that they can drive overall job 
creation. It is in fact increasingly the case that job creation is driven by self-employment and small 
firms (Arzeni, 1998; Baptista, Escaria & Madruga, 2007; Malchow-Møller, Schjerning & Sørensen, 
2009).  A large welfare state represents numerous barriers to start-up activity (Henreksson, 2005; 
Bjørnskov & Foss, 2008); overall job creation and employment levels suffer as a consequence (for 
evidence from the OECD, see Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia & Pissarides, 2001).  In this perspective, one 
can thus think of entrepreneurial ventures as activities that are limited by the rise of the welfare state, 
although they protect welfare states from falling too far behind in terms of productivity in the private 
sector that necessarily finances welfare spending. The long-run dynamics of such political-economic 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Observations 
Agricultural employment 3.80572 2.7413 140 
Government consumption 4.784 1.650 140 
Government enterprise 6.807 2.487 140 
Government final consumption 15.043 3.882 140 
Government size 4.864 1.268 140 
Information flows 75.318 17.318 140 
Investment prices 82.857 23.410 140 
Legal quality 7.917 1.068 140 
Log population size 9.609 1.469 140 
Openness 68.746 32.439 140 
Postcommunist .050 .219 140 
Self employment 14.988 5.816 140 
Sound money 8.507 1.627 140 
Special production .086 .289 140 
Tax burden 2.856 2.226 139 
Total factor productivity 87.858 12.254  140 
Transfers and subsidies 5.012 1.694 140 































































Legal quality -.348 
(1.231) 
    
Sound money -.295 
(.705) 
    
Regulatory freedom -2.884* 
(1.556) 



























      
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 140 140 140 140 111 
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 
R squared .587 .568 .502 .519 .596 
Wald Chi / F stat 277.63 271.75 26.72 27.42 32.79 
First stage F stat   25.84 14.68 /  22.35 14.89 /  24.08 
Hansen J stat, p<   .772 .453 .828 
Note: *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. Instruments in columns 3 are the logarithm to population 
size, the investment price level and Dreher’s (2008) index of global ‘information flows”; in columns 4 and 5, we add 
interactions between these instruments and government size.  
 
 











Government size 1 .512 .692 .657 .808 
Government consumption  1 .362 -.061 .292 
Transfers and subsidies   1 .211 .432 
Government enterprise    1 .389 
Tax burden     1 





Table 4. Basic estimates, determinants of total factor productivity 
 



































Government size -1.770 
(2.608) 





   
Transfers and 
subsidies 
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(.942) 
 



































Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 140 140 140 140 139 
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 
R squared .519 .272 .392 .526 .410 
Wald Chi / F stat 27.42 20.66 23.38 20.52 18.43 
First stage F stat 14.68 /  22.35 8.50 / 9.53 15.75 / 12.07 18.67 / 21.53 16.95 / 21.53 
Hansen J stat, p< .453 .875 .876 . 523 .572 
Note: all estimates are 2SLS; *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. Instruments are the logarithm to 
population size, the investment price level and Dreher’s (2008) index of global ‘information flows”, supplemented by 





Table 5. Robustness tests 
 
 Minimum Maximum Ratio Bootstrap 




   1.921*** 
(.532) 
Government enterprise -.544 
(.798) 






















Self* taxes -015 
(.11538) 




Note: *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. The ratios in column 3 are ratios between the minimum 
and maximum estimates, as evaluated at the sample mean. In both cases, the country exclusion providing the minimum 





Table 6. Illustrating effects of change in entrepreneurship 
 
 25th percentile Average 75th percentile 


















Note: *** (**) [*] denote significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10], evaluated at the 25th percentile, the sample mean, and the 
75th percentile. Numbers in italics are change as percent of a standard deviation, resulting from a one-standard deviation 
change of self-employment, which is approximately a five percentage point increase.  
 
Appendix Table A1 
Country TFP Country TFP 
Australia 90.03 Japan 78.8252 
Austria 97.08 Mexico 64.66338 
Belgium 109.62 Netherlands 93.81124 
Canada 90.04 New Zealand 68.90311 
Denmark 82.28 Norway 95.09719 
Finland 87.45 Poland 67.71223 
France 97.31 Portugal 84.99915 
Germany 90.31 Spain 100.4915 
Greece 88.46 Sweden 99.07012 
Hungary 79.71803 Switzerland 76.69347 
Iceland 96.07635 United Kingdom 99.54288 
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